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In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v. Falstaff
Victor P. Goldberg
Abstract
Bloor v. Falstaff has become the standard casebook example of judicial interpretation of a “best
efforts” clause.   The court held that Falstaff’s lackluster promotional efforts for Ballantine beer
violated its “best efforts covenant, a result that has met with near universal app oval.  However, when
the problem is properly framed, the decision is clearly wrong.  The court’s failure to consider the
purpose of the transaction led it astray.  Falstaff almost certainly did not breach its obligation.
The essential feature of the contra t is that Ballantine was exiting the beer business and  was
making a one-shot sale of some of its assets to Falstaff.  Ballantine wanted to receive the highest
possible price and, other things equal, the fewer post-sale restrictions on Falstaff’s exploitation of the
assets, the more Falstaff would be willing to pay. So, any restriction, like the best efforts clause,
immediately raises a red flag: how might the particular restriction raise the value of the Ballantine
assets, ex ante?  The deal included an “earnout” designed to cope with the information asymmetries
inherent in the transaction.  A significant part of Ballantine’s compensation was in the form of a per
barrel royalty.  The role of the best efforts clause was to guard against the possibility that Falstaff
could obtain the value from the Ballantine assets in a manner which bypassed the royalty.  The poor
performance of Ballantine beer post-acquisition was due not to Falstaff’s diversion of revenue, but
to the poor quality of the Ballantine assets (and the changing conditions in the beer industry). 
Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).  Casebooks which reprint1
it as a main case include STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 448 (1995); JOHN D.
CALAMARI ET AL ., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 459 (2d ed. 1989); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACT 623 (5th ed. 1995);
LON L.  FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 868 (6th ed. 1996);
ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 254 (2d ed. 1992);
ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 280 (1988).  The
decision is briefly noted in the Knapp and Murray casebooks.  CHARLES C. KNAPP & NATHAN M.
CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 503 (3d ed. 1993); JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 260 (4th ed. 1991).  The case is
cited in Murphy, but there is no further discussion.  EDWARD J MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 792 (5th ed. 1997).  
E. A. Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises:  the Duty of Best Efforts in2
Contract Law, University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 1, 10 (1984).  “The opinion may seem
somewhat disappointing in that the breach was sufficiently flagrant that the court did not define
‘best efforts’ with precision.”  E. A. Farnsworth and W. F. Young, Contracts: Cases and
Materials—Fifth Edition, Manual For Teachers, pp. 186-7. 
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When contracting parties cannot quite define their obligations, they often re ort to placeholder
language, like “best efforts.”  They (and their counsel) likely hav  littl  idea of what they might mean,
but, so long as they avoid litigation, it won’t much matter.  But “best efforts” clauses are on occasion
litigated and courts must read content into them.  In Bloor v. Falstaff, a casebook favorite, the court1
held that Falstaff’s lackluster promotional efforts for Ballantine beer violat d its best efforts covenant.
So far as I can tell, no commentators have questioned this outcome.  Indeed, some commentators
have found Falstaff’s breach so egregious as to not provide much of a test of the boundaries of “best
efforts.”  Farnsworth, for example, says:   “Unfortunately, its decision did relatively little to add
precision to the meaning of 'best efforts,' since Kalmanovitz [of Falstaff] fell so far short of the mark.”
  However, when the problem is properly framed, the decision is clearly wrong.  Falstaff almost2
certainly did not breach its obligation.
The analysis is complicated by the poor drafting of the contract.  “Best efforts” can only be
defined contextually and here the context is a badly botched deal.  If we look at the contract the
parties hould have written, it would be an easy caseSindeed, it is unlikely that the “best efforts”
language would have even appeared (at least not in the contested clause).  In the actual agreement,
Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 454 F.Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y 1978).3
Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).4
See, for example, J.C. Bruno, "Best Efforts" Defined, 71 Mich. B.J. 74, 76 (1992)5
(“Falstaff agreed to distribute Ballantine beer, in addition to its own label, in exchange for
payments to Ballantine . . .”).  Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 Geo.
L.J. 583, 608-9 (“The plaintiff signed a contract in which Falstaff, the defendant, agreed to use its
‘best efforts’ to promote the sale of Ballantine beer (which continued to be produced by
Ballantine breweries).”).  Lawrence S. Long,  Best Efforts as Diligence Insurance: in Defense of
"Profit Uber Alles," 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1728, 1733 (1986) (“Falstaff would not have agreed to
spend money up front marketing Ballantine if Ballantine could later have come back and
demanded a higher royalty . . .”).   Robert E. Scott and Douglas Leslie casebook at 291 (“What
changes do you think would be made in a new agreement between these two companies? Is that
relationship likely to be renewed after litigation?  Was litigation necessarily the best solution
here?”)
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott,  Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev.6
1089 (1981).
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there are three plausible interpretations of best efforts.  None is consistent with the n rpretations
forwarded by Judge Brieant at trial and Judge Friendly on appeal.3 4
The essential feature of the contra t is that Ballantine was exiting the beer business and  was
making a one-shot sale of some of its assets to Falstaff.  Falstaff was not contracting to be a
distributor for another beer producer, the remarks of numerous commentators notwithstanding. The5
purpose of the contractSs le of an asset, not distribution of productSis cr ial for understanding the
role of this “best efforts” clause.  The fact that some of Ballantine’s compensation was contingent
upon Falstaff’s selling effort makes it appear similar to a distribution agreement.  But the purpose of
the contingent compensation is quite different and that should be taken int account whe  interpreting
the contract.  Thus, while I am sympathetic to the Goetz-Scott argument that the contract should be
interpreted to maximize expected joint profits, I disagree with their application of it to this case6
(which, in effect, treats the deal as if it were a distribution arrangement).
In Part I, I summarize the facts and the two opinions.  In Part II, I explore the role of the
contingent compensation in the sale of an asset and apply that analysis to the facts of Bloor.
I.  The Background
A.  The Facts
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the two published decisions cited above7
at notes 3 and 4.  The record of the case is available on microfiche from the author; citations to
the record will be limited to material not available in the public record.
They attempted unsuccessfully, to convert the brewery into an industrial park.  On8
October 21, 1974, IFC and its wholly-owned subsidiary IFC Collateral Corporation both filed for
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.  On November 1, 1974, James Bloor was
appointed Trustee, replacing the Dansker management.  On December 23, 1980, while other suits
were still ongoing, Judge Bonsal approved a reorganization plan in which Helmsley Enterprises
would inject new money.  See In re Investors Funding Corp., 8 B.R. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  Other
litigation stemming from the IFC bankruptcy dragged on for over a decade.  The Trustee Bloor
had taken the position that a massive fraud had been perpetrated on the Company, and he sued the
Danskers, the banks, the accountants, IFC’s outside legal counsel, various others and, of course,
Falstaff.  The Trustee’s claims against the principal accountants were dismissed.  S e In re
Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  Claims of the Trustee against the
outside directors, IFC’s outside legal counsel and various other individuals were also dismissed. 
See In re Investors Funding Corp., 566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d sub nom.  Bloor v.
Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1985).  Other claims of the
Trustee against IFC’s outside legal counsel were finally dismissed in 1986.  Se  In reInvestors
Funding Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).  In addition, holders of the stock and
debentures of IFC filed five class actions against the Danskers, the accountants and the banks
which were consolidated for trial.  The securities holders settled with the banks and the
accountants on March 17, 1981.  See In re Investors Funding Corp., 9 B.R. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
In an unrelated matter, some of IFC’s officers faced criminal charges, stemming from the
development of the George Washington Plaza shopping center.  They were charged with
conspiracy to give a $100,000 bribe to Burt Ross, the Mayor of Fort Lee, New Jersey.  On March
28, 1975, former IFC officers Norman Dansker, Donald Orenstein and Stephen Haymes were
convicted of bribery.  SeeUnited States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied429
U.S. 1038 (1977).  They eventually served six months in jail.  See Walter H. Waggoner, Terms
Cut for 4 in Ft. Lee Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, February 4, 1978, at 1. 
Judge Brieant scolded the parties for their method, but acknowledged that “it was the9
manner chosen by the parties for their own purposes, and they must each accept the
consequences. . . .  They should”, he said, “have conducted themselves in a more mature fashion. 
Had they done so, at least some of the later disputes and difficulties could have been anticipated
-4-
Ballantine, a regional brewery selling low-priced beer primarily in the New York area, was
sold to Investors Funding Corporation (IFC), a real estate firm, in 1969.  IFC lost a considerable7
amount of money with Ballantine, and left the beer business in 1972.  It kept the brewery (eventually
selling it for non-beer making purposes), selling off the remainder of the business to Falstaff, a larger8
regional brewery that had no presence in the New York market. The parties had explored the deal
for a few months but the final negotiations involved a marathon session of three days with no breaks
for meals, characterized by one of the participants as "negotiation-by-endurance."  Falstaff paid9
and avoided." (At 276, n. 11)
PX 9 at A1618.10
Deposition of Falstaff's Ralph Weir, at A1576.11
PX23,  A1677, A1678-9.12
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$4,00,000 plus a royalty of fifty cents per barrel for six years.  Ballantine's sales in the IFC years
were about 2.2 million barrels per year, well below the 1964 peak of 4.4 million barrels. Had Falstaff10
maintained Ballantine’s sales volume the royalty payment would have been over $1,000,000 per year.
For acquisition purposes, the rule of thumb in the beer business at that time was to value the target
at about $4 per barrel, which would have put a value on Ballantine of about $8.5-$9 million.11
Falstaff agred to use “best efforts” to promote and maintain a high volume of sales and further
agreed to pay a cash sum in the event of a substantial discontinuance of distribution under the
Ballantine brand name.  The terms will be discussed in more detail below. 
Falstaff’s strategy was to en er the New York market, selling beer from its Cranston, Rhode
Island brewery, under both the Ballantine and Falstaff labels.  F lst ff was a premium beer, Ballantine
a low price beer, although, in fact, the beer in the two containers was identical. Falstaff expected that
buying the Ballantine assets would help it in three ways.  First, Ballantine had a trademark that was
potentially valuable, especially in the New York area.  Second, it had an existing distribution network
in the New York area (it was servicing some 25,000 accounts); Falstaff would not have to assemble
one to sell Ballantine and could use that network to develop the market for Falstaff.  Third,
consolidating production in the Cranston facility and closing Ballantine’s Newark brewery (which had
been operating at less than fifty percent capacity, would increase capacity utilization rate, thereby
decreasing average production costs. 
The record is mixed as to the appropriate weighting of these components.  In his letter to the
Justice Department immediately following the acquisition, Falstaff's outside counsel described the
purpose:
You requested that I confirm Falstaff's purpose in acquiring the Ballantine
brands and the steps which will be taken to produce and market Ballantine beer and
ale.  The primary purpose of the acquisition is to utilize the excess productive capacity
of Falstaff's seven plants.
*   *   *
A further purpose of the acquisition (though not a major one) is that
opportunity is afforded to introduce Falstaff beer on a pr mium price level in the New
York metropolitan market.  Any such introduction would necessarily be low-keyed,
since Falstaff does not have the r sources to support any other kind of entry into this
market. 12
A Falstaff internal document written at the very beginning of the process put much more weight on
using the acquisition to facilitate Falstaff's entrance into the New York market:
Falstaff internal document entitled "Opportunistic Approach to Ballantine," PX 9,13
A1616, A1618-9 dated 9/1/71).
Paul Kalmanovitz arrived in America penniless in his mid-20's and built a fortune in beer14
and real estate estimated at $250 million (enough to earn him a spot on the  Forbes 400 lis ) at the
time of his death in 1987.  See Burt A. Folkart, “Paul Kalmanovitz, Beer Industry Magnate,
Dies,” Los Angeles Times January 23, 1987, p. 28.  His treatment of Ballantine was consistent
with his treatment of the other beer labels he acquired.  “Kalmanovitz's reputation as a cost-cutter
was so dreaded that employees at Falstaff Brewing's St. Louis headquarters flew the flag upside
down and at half-mast when they learned that [he] had taken it over in 1975.  ‘He went through
Falstaff like Grant went through Richmond -- he took no hostages,’ recalls [his successor].” 
“Taking no hostages,”  Forbes May 22, 1995.
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Let us further assume that, since Ballantine is a declining brand, that Falstaff
will not support and promote the brand, but, rather, cut advertising and promotion
expense to the bone and expect a rapid decline in sales of approximately 20% per
year.  Let us assume further that Falstaff uses the direct distribution system set up by
Ballantine in the 5 boroughs and Northern New Jersey to promote Falstaff at a
premium price.  Since this is a large market, the market entry costs will be high. . . .
In other words, the Ballantine distribution system will increase its distribution of
Falstaff to offset the loss of volume for Ballantine such that the plants continue to
produce at the capacity level the same as when Ballantine production was initiated.
*   *   *
Thus, under these assumptions, it does not seem worthwhile to purchase
Ballantine except for the entry to the N.Y. markets.  13
In any event, it did not work out.  Falstaff continued to promote Ballantine at about the same
level as IFC had, but sales kept falling and red ink spilling.  Falstaff claimed losses in 1972-75 of $22
million on its Ballantine operations.  In 1975, Paul Kalmanovitz acquired effective control of Falstaff
and dramatically changed its operations.  In particular, he cut the Ballantine advertising budget14
nearly 90%, cut sales personnel, and closed or phased out four of the six distribution centers.
Ballantine’s sales plummeted.  Some of the decline was attributable to the general sales decrease of
regional beers, but Ballantine’s sales fell faster than the sales of similarly situated beers.
In the meantime, IFC went into bankruptcy.  Bloor, the trustee in bankruptcy for IFC, filed
suit against Falstaff claiming, among other things, that Kalmanovitz’s change of direction in 1975
violated Falstaff’s best efforts obligation or, alternatively, amounted to a substantial discontinuance.
There were some side issues related to the fact that some of Ballantine's pre-transaction sales volume
was generated by illegal marketing practices, most of which were widespread in the industry, but the
core of the dispute remained the best efforts and substantial discontinuance questions.
B.  The Contract
Clause 1 of the contract.  The complete contract is available as PX-1 at pages A1584-15
A1616.  In each instance Falstaff would acquire Ballantine’s “right, title, and interest,” with the
specific items defined in separate exhibits.
Clause 4.16
Clause 6(a).17
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Falstaff purchased the “Ballantine Assets” which were defined in the contract.  These15
included (a) the “Proprietary Rights,” Ballantine’s brand names, trademarks, trade names, and
copyrights; (b) Ballantine’s distribution network, including contracts, orders agreements,
commitments, supply and requirements contracts, and collective bargain ng agreements relating to
the sale and delivery of its malt alcoholic beverage directly to retail sellers; (c) most of Ballantine’s
accounts receivable, roughly $9 million; and (d) miscellaneous items including the existing  inventory
and supplies, vehicles, cooperage, returnable cases and bottles and similar items.  Falstaff paid $4
million cash in three installments, the last paymen on the date of closing.  In addition, Falstaff would
pay a royalty of $.50 per barrel:
2 (a)(v) on the 7th day of each month, commencing May 7, 1972, and terminating
April 7, 1978 (the “Royalt  Period”), a sum in cash computed at the rate of $.50 per
barrel for each barrel of 31 U. S. gallons sold by the Buyer during the precedin
calendar month under any of the Proprietary Rights, as royalties in respect of the use
of such Proprietary Rights. (Emphasis added)
The italicized clause was omitted in both opinions.  As we shall see below, the clause is significant
for interpreting the agreement.
That clause included a liquidated damages clause that would have come into effect if Falstaff
substantially discontinued distribution of Ballantine. 
provided, however, that if during the Royalty Period the Buyer substantially
discontinues the distribution of beer under the brand name “Ballantine” . . .  , it will
pay to the Seller a cash sum equal to the years and fraction thereof remaining in the
Royalty Period times $1,100,000, payable in equal monthly installments on the first
day of each month commencing with the first month following the month in which
such discontinuation occurs. . . .
The clause at the center of the litigation, which included a rather embarrassing typographical
error, read as follows: “8. Certain Other Covenants of Buyer.  (a) After the Closing Date the Seller
[sic!] will use its best efforts to promote and maintain a high volume of sales nd r the Proprietary
Rights.” (Emphasis added) 
This was not the only appearance of “best efforts” in the agreement.  It appears six other
times.  Falstaff agrees to use its best efforts to keep confidential non-public information about the
seller.  The seller agrees that if any of its contracts are not assignable, it will use its best efforts to16
obtain consent of third parties.  Falstaff agrees to use its best efforts to collect the seller’s17
Clause 6(b).  The phrase is used twice in this context.18
Clause 8(g).19
Clause 8(d).20
Clause 2 (a)(vi).21
Clause 2(a)(vii) and clause 2(b).22
Discussed in the lower court decision at 274; At the time of closing Pflaumer owed over23
$800,000.  
Clause 2(d).  "If the Buyer shall . . . file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy . . . [or other24
bankruptcy and insolvency related conditions] then each of the payments or installments provided
for in subparagraph (v) of paragraph (a) above shall immediately become forthwith due and
payable without demand or other notice of any kind."
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receivables (a contractually defined subset of the receivables).  The buyer also promises to use best18
efforts to collect the buyer’s receivables.  This is not as odd as it first appears, since the seller has19
some financial stake in the buyer’s receivabl s.  Falstaff also agrees to use best efforts to retain as its
own employees Ballantine’s sales, marketing, clerical, and administrative personnel.  The ca ual20
usage of the phrase in these varied contexts does suggest a certain lack of care about its content.
At the closing Falstaff was to pay cash for 75% of Ballantine's receivables. In addition, it21
would pay to IFC 75% of all receivables collected beyond that, subject to a ceiling of $7,125,000.22
There was some concern over the receivables since in Pennsylvania it was unlawful for beer to be sold
on credit and at least one large receivable (Pflaumer) was from Pennsylvania.  The tre tment of23
receivables, as we shall see, turned out to have some significance, since IFC claimed (and Judge
Brieant agreed) that Falstaff's payment for the receivables was part of the horse trading involving the
critical terms in the contract.  
The contract  included what amounts to an acceleration clause, requiring Falstaff to pay
immediately all money due under the royalty clause in the event of its bankruptcy.   The language24
is unclear, but I believe the clause means that the $1.1 million per year liquidated damages would be
due, not the uncertain expected value of the sum of future royalty payments. Falstaff also agreed to
pledge to IFC the proprietary rights (the trademarks) as security for the royalty payments.  If,
however, such a pledge would be in violation of any of Falstaff's pre-exi ing agreements, Falstaff will
"in good faith attempt to obtain . . . any consents to such pledge which may be required; and if any
required consent is unobtainable or obtainable only upon conditions detrimental to [Falstaff], such
pledge will not be deliverable as aforesaid.  In such event, [Falstaff] will furnish [IFC] with suc
Clause 8(b).  I suspect that nothing was intended by the use of "good faith" here as25
opposed to "best efforts" which is scattered through the remainder of the document  (including
three of the seven covenants of the buyer in clause 8). 
Clause 8(e).26
At 266.27
Insolvency or bankruptcy does not excuse performance of a contract.  While the point is28
correct, it would take a large leap of logic to apply it to interpretation of the best efforts language.
At 267.29
At 267.30
“In any event, after May 1976, any inability to appoint such an exclusive distributor in31
the New York area was caused by the fault or negligence of Falstaff. To the extent such fault or
negligence prevented it from using effective marketing methods in the area which Molyneux
proposed to serve, it is answerable in damages to Ballantine.
*   *   *
“Mr. Kalmanovitz as a traditional businessman expressed at trial his contempt for
‘studies"’ and ‘projections.’ Consequently, in making the decisions to close the North Bergen
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evidence as it may reasonably request to ascertain the reasons therefor."  Falstaf  agreed not to25
transfer the proprietary rights during the royalty period without IFC's written consent.26
C.  The Decisions
Trial was held without a jury.  Falstaff argued that best efforts "must include considerations
of Falstaff's own allegedly precarious financial position. Plaintiff, on the contrary, ci ed subst ntial
precedent holding that financial difficulty and economic hardship do not excuse performance of a
contract, and argued for the application of an objective standard, that of the 'average, prudent
comparable' brewer."  Judge Brieant cited with approval precedent which would not excuse27
performance even in the face of financial difficulty or economic hardship.  But he did not go this far.28
Falstaff did not have to spend itself into bankruptcy to meet its contractual obligation, but it did have
to meet the prudent comparable brewer standard, "and this it failed to do."  29
Judge Brieant presented a litany of things Falstaff did (or failed to do) in failing to meet its
best efforts obligation.  He cited Falstaff's closing of four of its retail distribution centers, including
the North Bergen facility, which, he said, had been losing about $2.2 million annually distributing
Falstaff and Ballantine products.  He criticized Falstaff's shifting from a distribution system which30
sold to a large number of retail accounts to one selling to a small number of wholesale accounts, in
particular the assignment of the New York market to a particular distributor (Fatato) and Falstaff's
failure to accept a different one (Molyneux).   The judge also criticized Falstaff's severe “cutback of31
facility and to appoint Mr. Fatato distributor in the New York City area, no effort was made to
ascertain in advance the effect on Ballantine sales. . . .   Falstaff was willing to appoint a
distributor for the area, Mr. Fatato, about whose abilities the President of Falstaff had serious
reservations, and to continue him in a virtual monopoly of Falstaff products in the area despite
Mr. Molyneux's proposals. These actions exceed any reasonable variance allowable in the exercise
of sound business judgment. No effort was made by Falstaff to examine or find alternatives to the
drastic step of closing the North Bergen facility, although it accounted for a very large percentage
of Ballantine sales.” (At 269)
At 270.  Note that if this violated the best efforts obligation to sell Ballantine it likely32
would have also violated the best efforts obligation to keep employed the Ballantine personnel;
see text at note 20 above.
At 270.33
At 270-71.34
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personnel in distribution, sales, marketing, administrative and warehousing areas.  It virtually
eliminated its promotion and advertising of Ballantine Beer and closed its advertising department.”32
He quoted, and implicitly criticized, Kalmanovitz's description of his marketing strategy:
We sell beer and you pay for it. . . .  We sell beer, F. O. B. the brewery.  You
come and get it.
Our responsibility is to give good product and you got responsibility to pay
for it.  That's it.  That's the substance of my arrangement.  Its working.33
Falstaff had not, he held, tr ated Ballantine equally.  Even if they had, he argued, that would
not be enough.
Falstaff's relationship to Ballantine is essentially different from its relationship to its
own products. In the latter case, it may promote, continue or discontinue its products
as it wills, subject to its duty to shareholders; in the former case it is bound by a
contractual duty to the promisee.  As the court said in a case cited by the defendant
here: “‘(B)est energies’ meant such effort as in the exercise of sound judgment would
be likely to produce the most profitable results to the promisee in view of the nature
of the business and the extent of the territory over which it was to be conducted.”
Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 212 Mass. 352, 374, 99 N.E. 221, 226 (1912).34
Moreover, he suggested, Falstaff's incentives favored promoting Falstaff at the expense of
Ballantine.
Some of this apparent callousness towards Ballantine sales is undoubtedly caused by
the fact that even though the liquid in a can of Ballantine Beer and in a can of Falstaff
Beer is identical, and accordingly costs exactly the same amount to produce, sale of
Falstaff Beer produces a greater profit for Falstaff. In part this is the result of the fact
At 269-70.35
At 266.36
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that Falstaff is a "premium" beer and nets Falstaff about $4.20 more a barrel than does
Ballantine, even before the $.50 Ballantine royalty is subtracted from the latter.35
Judge Brieant rejected the claim that Falstaff's behavior amounted to substantial
discontinuance of Ballantine.  Falstaff had continuet  d stribute beer under the Ballantine name and
had introduced Ballantine in other markets.  Ballantine's sales had dropped dramatically.  However,
[a] very significant part of this decline is attributable . . . to the general decline of the
market share of the smaller brewers, and to other causes unconnected with Falstaff's
closing of the North Bergen facility. The remaining decline is regarded as
"insubstantial" under the contract. It is clear from the royalty rate established in the
contract itself that the liquidated damages clause was included to cover situations
approaching the total cessation of Ballantine production, rather than situations
involving gradual but significant declines in sales.36
Damages were calculated by subtracting Ballantine's actual sales from the sales that would
have been made had Falstaff used its best efforts (as determined by the court).  The judge assumed
that Ballantine's sales would have followed the same trend as two other small New York labels,
Schaefer and Rheingold.  After some modest deductions, primarily to exclude Ballantine sales that
were the product of illegal activities, the judge concluded that the royalties lost by Ballantine were
approximately $630,000.  Falstaff had withheld royalties during the litigation and these too were
awarded bringing the final judgement to about $1.3 million.
Falstaff appealed the best efforts ruling and Bloor the rejection of the substantial
discontinuance claim. Judge Friendly, speaking for a unanimous court, affirmed.   He restated Judge
Brieant's conclusion, softening it a bit.  Brieant’s decision might have been interpreted as requiring
Falstaff to continue promoting Ballantine regardless of the financial consequences.  Friendly made
clear, however, that “best efforts” did not mean that Falstaff must go to hese len ths.  But it did have
a special duty to promote Ballantine beer sales.  
While [the best efforts] clause clearly required Falstaff to treat the Ballantine brands
as well as its own, it does not follow that it required no more. With respect to its own
brands, management was entirely free to exercise its business judgment as to how to
maximize profit even if this meant serious loss in volume.  Because of the obligation
it had assumed under the sales contract, its situation with respect to the Ballantine
brands was quite different.  The royalty of $.50 a barrel on sales was an essential part
of the purchase price.  Even without the best efforts clause Falstaff would have been
bound to make a good faith effort to see that substantial sales of Ballantine products
were made, unless it discontinued under clause 2(a)(v) with consequent liability for
liquidated amages. . . .  Clause 8 imposed an added obligation t  use “best efforts
to promote and maintain a high volume of sales. . . .”  (emphasis supplied). Although
At 614-5.37
See text at notes 24 and 25.38
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we agree that even this did not require Falstaff to spend itself into bankruptcy to
promote the sales of Ballantine products, it did prevent the application to them of
Kalmanovitz' philosophy of emphasizing profit  uber alles without fair consideration
of the effect on Ballantine volume.  Plaintiff was not obliged to show just what steps
Falstaff could reasonably have taken to maintain a high volume for Ballantine
products.  It was sufficient to show that Falstaff simply didn't care about Ballantine's
volume and was content to allow this to plummet so long as that course was best for
Falstaff's overall profit picture, an inference which the judge permissibly drew.  The
burden then shifted to Falstaff to prove there was nothing significant it could have
done to promote Ballantine sales that would not have been financially disastrous.37
II.  The Deal
Conspicuous by its absence in both decisions is any analysis of why the contract included the
royalty arrangement and the best efforts covenant.  This is not the fault of the judges.  The record was
completely silent on this point.  So, we are left with the somewhat p culiar spectacle of a court giving
meaning to a context-sensitive phrase with no guidance as to the context.  The picture is clouded by
the fact that the parties themselves probably did not really understand the function of the royalty.  I
will first provide the context the court lacked.  Then, after showing hat the context dictates how best
efforts should be interpreted, I will consider how the parties understanding, or lack thereof, should
influence the decision.
IFC was, essentially, selling two assets—Ballantine’s brand name and its distribution network.
Its purpose was simple.  It wanted to sell at the highest price.  That should be obvious, but the court’s
failure to recognize this basic point is the core of the problem.  Other things equal, the fewer post-sale
restrictions on Falstaff’s exploitation of the assets, the more Falstaff would be willing to pay.
Falstaff’s pursuit of  “profit uber alles,” ex post, redounds to IFC’s benefit, ex ante.  So, any
restriction, like the best efforts clause, immediately raises a red flag: how might the particular
restriction raise the value of the Ballantine assets, ex ante?
A.  Contingent Compensation
Falstaff could have purchased the Ballantine assets outright rather than spreading the
compensation over six years and making the payment contingent upon Ballantine sales.  Why did they
choose the latter course?  Ballantine was, in effect, making a six year loan to Falstaff.  The security
arrangements and acceleration clause discussed above are manifestations of this.  A loan would38
make sense only if Falstaff could get terms at least as favorable from IFC as from alternative
If the costs of litigation are high, spreading the payments over time would give Falstaff39
some leverage to bargain down its future obligations.  Deferral changes the status quo for
subsequent litigation.
It is always possible that the structure of a transaction reflects tax consequences; I do not40
know of any in this instance and the record gave no indication of any. 
PX 14, dated Jan 8, 1972, A1624 at A1625.41
Such arrangements, called “earnouts,” are common in sales of corporate assets.42
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sources.  If restrictions in its existing capital structure—debt covenants and the like—constrained39
Falstaff, spreading the payments over time might have been a simple way of financing the transaction
without violating the constraint.   A Falstaff planning document entitled “Ballantine Observations”40
hinted at some of the financing considerations:
4. Falstaff's financing of this purchase —What form would it take—would it take
external financing, stock issue, additional long-term debt, what is the av ilability of
any of the forms of financing and what would it c st and what restrictions would it
place upon our operations.
5.  The present debt agreements
a. Do they allow this type of acquisition and when must these insuranc
companies be notified that we are considering such action.
6.  The stockholder approval—What would be the mechanics here—what is the
timing of such notification and what are the consequences of our announcing such to
the stockholders in light of our present earnings situation and that of the last few
years.41
While spreading the payments over time might be a perfectly sensible way to finance the project,
financing considerations cannot explain why the payments were contingent upon Ballantine sales.
Something more is necessary to explain why IFC in its role as financier would choose to take neither
a fixed return nor an equity position in Falstaff.
One explanation, which cannot work in this context, would be that Ballantine’s managers
were providing a bond to Falstaff to assure that they would not by their future actions reduce the
value of the Ballantine trademark.  Suppose that the top management of Ballantin  had developed
some good will with the beer market.  The value of the brand name they were selling would be
impaired if they could subsequently reenter and compete against Ballantine.  A promise not to
compete would, if enforceable, make the Ballantine assets more valuable.  Giving these managers an
interest inBallantine’s future sales or profits could substitute for, or complement, the non-compete
covenant.  The problem with this explanation, of course, is that the outgoing Ballantine executives42
Judge Brieant accurately characterized IFC’s competence in the beer business:43
Mr. Donald Orenstein was Executive Vice-President of Investors Funding
Corporation and of P. Ballantine & Sons at the time the negotiations with Falstaff
took place. He testified at trial to the IFC management's complete lack of
experience in the brewing industry. His own career began with IFC as a clerk, and
ultimately he became President of IFC Realty Service. He stated at trial his views
on IFC's acquisition of Ballantine (Tr. p. 124): “Q. When did it become apparent
to you that Investors Funding should sell P. Ballantine & Company? A. The
second day that I arrived at P. Ballantine, in '69. He (Mr. Jerome Dansker,
Chairman of the Board of IFC) bought it on a Thursday; I told him Friday to sell
it.” (At 263, n. 6)
See Victor P. Goldberg, The Gold Ring Problem, 47 University of Toronto L.J.46944
(1997) which also analyzes the case in which the buyer might have superior information. 
Ballantine had superior information about the quality of its assets, but Falstaff had superior
information about its plans on how to use those assets.  Contingent compensation allows the seller
to capture some of the gains despite its relative ignorance about the buyer’s plans.
See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset45
Pricing, 94 Yale L. J. 239, 262-4.
An earnout is a way of bridging the difference in evaluations and conveying the seller’s46
confidence in the quality.  See Gilson (note 45) at 262-7; Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle,97
Columbia Law Review 524, 544-6; and Goldberg, Gold Ring (note 44) at 494.
See text at note 15.47
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had no competence in the beer industry or expectation of staying in the beer industry and Falstaff43
knew it.  A promise not to compete, or any variant thereon, would have been worthless.
The one explanation that does make sense, regardle s of whether Falstaff wanted (or needed)
financing assistance from IFC, is that the parties had asymmetric information.  Ballantine was
certifying the quality of the assets.  In sales of complex assets the seller typically has more information
than the prospective buyer.  If buyers cannot distinguish good assets from bad, then they are likely44
to be suspicious of any particular asset and to reduce their offer price accordingly.  Sellers can get
a beter price if they can convince buyers of the quality of the asset.  There are myriad ways of
providing assurance.  The seller can provide extensive rpresentations and warranties; the buyer can45
engage in extensive due diligence investigation.  The parties have an incentive to economize on the
joint production of information.  By accepting some of its compensation in a contingent form, the
seller provides some assurance to the buyer of the quality of the asset.46
1.  The Proprietary Rights. The contract language, read literally, linked the royalty payment
to the proprietary rights alone.  That might be one more manifestation of bad drafting, but for the47
See text at note 35.48
At A1099.49
See text at note 20.50
Ballantine’s 1970 price was $26.60 per barrel (PX 9 at 1618) and the royalty rate was 5051
cents per barrel.
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moment let us assume that was what the parties intended.  How should the best efforts language be
interpreted?  Falstaff  purchased the proprietary rights in order to exploit them efficiently.  By
maintaining the flexibility to respond to new information as it appears, Falstaff increases the amount
it would be willing to pay Ballantine for the right to exploit the brand name.  Judge Brieant, recall,
suggested that Falstaff’s “callousness towards Ballantine sales” was evidence of Falstaff’s failure to
use best efforts.  But, as Falstaff’s CEO at the time of the transaction,  Robert Colson, testified:48
“The intention when we went into this deal was to use our best efforts, and that's exactly what it says
there.  We were going to go out and do our best efforts to promote he brand, or why would we have
bought he brand?  You don't buy something with the intention that you're going to abandon it.  If
you did, then you spend a lot of time wasting your time.”   “Best efforts,” in this interpretation, is49
little more than filler.  It means nothing more than “Aw shucks, we’ll really try,” as it did when
defining Falstaff’s obligation to try not to fire Ballantine’s low level personnel.  50
This argument has to be modified sl ghtly because the royalty arrangement distorts Falstaff’s
incentives.  The parties want an arrangement which maximizes the value to the buyer ex ante.  But
producing information and assurance is not costless.  The process of maximizing the value of the asset
can reduce the size of the joint pie.  The particular method chosen here, the royalty, has an adverse
effect by changing Falstaff’s incentives ex post.  And knowledge of this effect should reduce the value
of the assets ex ante.  The royalty acts as a tax (roughly 2%) on sales which could induce Falstaff51
to market a somewhat smaller amount of Ballantine product than it would have, but for the royalty.
So “best efforts” might possibly mean that Falstaff should push its sales effort a bit beyond the point
that would otherwise be optimal, ex post.  This is, I think, a bit of a stretch, but this would seem to
be the outer limits of the “best efforts” concept if it applied only to the proprietary rights.  The
distortion of incentives (which in this instance is quite minor) is a common problem in contingent
compensation arrangements (franchise fees, percentage leases, oil and g  royalties, and so forth) and
“best efforts” is just one of the devices for dealing with the problem.
2.  The Distribution Network.  Suppose instead that the contract language was not restricted
to the proprietary rights, but that “best efforts” applied as well to the collection of contracts and
informal relations that together made up Ballantine’s distribution network.  Falstaff was, after all,
attempting to break into the New York market to sell its own brand and Ballantine’s owners were
On Falstaff’s interest in the distribution network, see text at note 13.   On Ballantine’s52
awareness, see the testimony of Melvin Carro, of Falstaff: “There was an expression of concern
stated by somebody on the Ballantine side that possibly Falstaff would use the Ballantine
distribution system to come into the New York area, and then for reasons of its own, it might be
possible . . . that Falstaff would concentrate on the sales of Falstaff, and either abandon or let the
Ballantine beer sales diminish.”  (A1074-5)
For completeness, we can identify another diversion possibility.  Instead of selling53
Ballantine beer under the proprietary rights, Falstaff might have sold Ballantine pretzels or
clothing or some other non-beer trademarked articles.  They didn’t, so I need not pursue the
matter further here.
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aware of this prospect.  Suppose, to take an extreme example,  that the proprietary rights were in52
fact worthless, but that the value was in the distribution network. Had Falstaff simply jettisoned the
Ballantine brand entirely and used the distribution network to distribute Falstaff beer instead, Falstaff
would not simply be maximizing the value of the asset (the distribution network)—it would be
diverting payment for that asset.  The royalty arrangement would fail completely in its purpose.53
More generally, to the extent that Falstaff could use the istribution network to sell Falstaff rather
than Ballantine, the royalty would not track the value of the asset.  Judge Brieant’s concern about
Falstaff’s “callousness” would be relevant under this interpretation of the contract.
A “best efforts” requirement is one contractual device for protecting against this sort of
diversion.  But the context suggests how the clause should be read.  “Best efforts” in this context
means that Falstaff agreed that in its pursuit of “profit uber alles” would not opportunistically divert
sales from Ballantine (the sales of which were to track asset value) to Falstaff.  Did Falstaff use the
network to divert more sales than the parties should reasonably have expected?  That might be a
difficult question to answer for some fact patterns, but for the facts o  this case the answer is easy and
negative.  When Kalmanovitz took charge he dismantled the distribution system.  Falstaff did not
divert resources to the more profitable brand, it simply terminated (or at least drastically pared) a
project that did not work.  
So, we are left with three plausible meanings of “best efforts” in the context of this
transaction.  First, it could just be noise with no effect at all on Falstaff’s obligation.  Second, it could
be aimed at correcting Falstaff’s incentives which were a bit distorted by the royalty “tax.”  Third,
and the contract language notwithstanding, the most plausible, it could have been an attempt to limit
diversion of revenue away from the device chosen to provide assurance of that value.  None of these
provides a basis for concluding that Falstaff’s pursuit of profit uber alles by revising its Ballantine
marketing strategy and dismantling much of the Ballantine distributio  network violated its obligation
to Ballantine.
This is a simple and, I believe, compelling story.  There is only one problem with it. It is not
the story told by the witnesses or counsel.  That does not make it wrong.  But it does raise the
questions of how courts are supposed to figure it out and, if they do, what they should do about it.
On publishing contracts, see Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of54
Markets, 25 J. of Law & Economics 27, 34 (1982) and Henry Hansmann and Renier Kraakman
Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J. of
Law, Econ. & Org. 628 (1992).  On gross profits compensation in movies, see Goldberg (N t
Profits)  note 46, at 547-8.
A price differential of around 20% is not trivial.  However, we should recognize that55
brewers engage in a form of (legal) price discrimination by targeting different groups with beers
priced accordingly.  There is no reason to believe that Falstaff could sell its brand to the “price
beer” market reached by the Ballantine brand and maintain the price differential.
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That problem is compounded by the “substantial discontinuance” proviso which can be explained, but
the explanation is neither so simple nor compelling.  After attempting to make some sense of the
proviso, I will return to the problem of decision-making by an ill-informed court.
B.  Substantial Discontinuance
It is common to couple royalty payment schemes with minimum payment obligations. 
Such arrangements are common in publishing and movies  (talent receive royalties or a percentage
of the gross to be offset against a bargained for fixed fee), licensing agreements, franchising,54
shopping center and other retail leases, and so forth.  It is tempting to assume that such arrangements
would make sense in the sale of an asset, as in the present case.  Indeed, my initial presumption was
that the “substantial discontinuance” clause was a poorly drafted attempt to create a minimum
obligation.  However, I was wrong.  The minimum does not add anything useful for the sale of an
asset where the seller, like Ballantine, has no interest in, or affect upon, the outcomes other than the
receipt of its compensation.
Consider first the proprietary rights.  Up to the minimum, the effective tax rate is zero.
Incentives still are distorted at the margin, but a high minimum means that at least over a broad range,
the buyer’s incentives are not distorted.  But the higher the minimum, the weaker the quality
assurance provided by the royalty.  A high minimum undercuts the quality assurance function since
the purchaser must pay regardless of quality.  So, while a minimum annual payment might hel
correct the tax distortion of the per barrel royalty, it does so only by undercutting the purpose.
A minimum guarantee might conceivably be of a bit more use in policing diversion.  If the
parties were indeed concerned with the possibility that Falstaff would use the Ballantine distribution
network to distribute Falstaff beer, a minimum obligation would have imposed a sharp limit on
Falstaff’s ability to do so.  But if the advantage of distributing Falstaff were substantial (recall Judge
Brieant’s claim that in addition to the 50 cent per barrel royalty, the identic l beer sold for $4.50 more
per barrel when labeled Falstaff), then Falstaff would have had a strong incentive to treat th55
minimum as a target.  The royalty would serve no particular function.
Orenstein deposition at A1465-66.  Falstaff’s attorney made the same point:56
During the negotiations, P. Ballantine & Sons attempted to elicit from Falstaff a
guarantee as to the minimum royalty that would be paid to Ballantine, and Falstaff
staunchly resisted any effort to force a minimum payment of royalties, and so the
contract read that there would be only best efforts required of Falstaff Brewing
Corporation. (At A60)
Falstaff's Reply Brief raised, somewhat half-heartedly, the possibility that the proviso57
might be a penalty clause: “[A] construction of the proviso that would give it effect in any
circumstances other than the near total cessation of Ballantine production would make of it, not a
liquidated damages provision, but an unenforceable penalty clause.”  (p. 37)
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Ballantine asked for a minimum guarantee, but Falstaff refused.  Ballantine’s Orenstei
testified:
Falstaff was never willing to give us a guarantee of a million one.  They said they
would use their best efforts . . . they didn't give us really, what we wanted.  W
wanted a million  one guarantee, that if for any reason the sales dropped below fifty
cents a barrel times two million two . . . we would be guaranteed at le st, a million
one, and that's not in the contract.
Q. It did not get in there?
A. No. We traded that off.  It did not get in there.56
Although the contract did not include a minimum guarantee, it did include liquidated damages
of $1.1 million per year (the same amount Ballantine had been asking as the minimum) in the event
of Falstaff’s substantial discontinuance of Ballantine.  If this proviso was included as part of the
quality assurance mechanism, as I first thought, it makes no sense.  In effect, it says: if the assets are
really terrible so that they are unusable, then Falstaff pays Ballantine $1.1 million per year for the
duration; if on the other hand, they are only pretty bad, Falstaff pays less.  That is a perverse result,
which I thought, could only be explained by poor drafting.
However, the clause makes more sense if it is viewed as being independent of the quality of
the proprietary rights and instead concerns diversion of revenues from the exploitation of Ballantine’s
distribution network.  That might be a somewhat heroic reading, given that the contract language
refers to compensation for the proprietary rights.  With this reading Falstaff says, in effect: We agree
that we will not cheat you by diverting receipts from the metering device (Ballantine sales) and
profiting by the use of the other valuable asset we have purchased, your distribution network; if we
have done too much diversion, we agree to pay a penalty (although he law does not permit us to call
it that).  The trigger for the penalty would not be the quantity of Ballantine sold nationally.  Rather,57
it would be the percentage of Ballantine being sold through the old Ballantine network.  
But this mechanism had one big hole.  What if the network itself turned out to be of little or
no value, as was in fact the case?  Falstaff essentially abandoned the network, bu  co tinued to exploit
the proprietary rights as best it could.  If the proviso’s purpose was to thwart massive diversion of
 At A1473-4.58
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revenues, there was no diversion.  Falstaff bore the direct risk of the distribution network being a
lemon; it seems unlikely that ex ante the parties would have wanted Falstaff to post an additional
bond against that prospect.  But, and this must be emphasized, it is most likely that neither part
expected the distribution network to be worth so little, and the contract reflected their failure to
anticipate this possibility.
C.  So, What’s a Poor Court to Do?
The parties did not give the court much assistance in framing the case.  This is, I believe, less
a matter of the p culiar way in which facts percolate up through the judicial system than of genuine
confusion.  Orenstein’s testimony on the origins of the controversial terms is indicative: 
In substance what happened is that we just couldn't get together on those three items.
It was the accounts receivables, the best efforts, and . . . the words substantial
discontinuance.  What does that really mean? How does one determine that? Can't we
put in a formula? No, we won't give you a form l ; we don't want to attach ourselves
to anything.  That's Colson's exact words.  We told him, H w can we make a deal not
knowing where we're going?  He said, Well, you have to believe that we're experts in
the beer business for so many years; you're not selling to u  just to collect a million
one, you're going to look to us to collect much more, and we'll be able to increase the
sales.
I said, Well, if that's the way you feel, why don't you write it?  He said, No,
he's not prepared to do that.  They have certain standards under which they do deals,
and that's one of them.  They didn't want to put it in writing, but that's how we came
to the receivable.  I said, If that's the feeling, give me something.  Take my
receivables.  He said, Maybe we'll do that.  That's how the next dialogue started.
They then recessed. . . .
I told [my colleagues] that the substantial discontinuance thing bothers me.
What does that mean?  Should we put in a percentage?  Do you think we should try
for a percentage?  Then we all collectively said, in our minds, 30 percent would be
considered a substantial discontinuance.  I went back and mentioned that figure and
they laughed.  There was no way they would do it.58
Ballantine’s lawyers asked various witnesses what best efforts meant to them and whether it
meant more than good faith, a sterile inquiry designed to wrench damning statements out of th
mouths of unwary witnesses.  But neither side ever framed the question in terms of the underlying
purpose of the transaction: sale of an asset of uncertain vale.  The courts accepted the parties’ terms
of debate.
This was not inevitable.  A court with a confident understanding of what the deal was about
could easily have framed the best efforts question properly and disposed of it cleanly.  From the
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contractual context, the plausible meanings of best efforts were narrowly circumscribed and under
all of those meanings, Falstaff had satisfied its obligation.  
The substantial discontinuance proviso was another matter.  The most plausible explanation
concerns the diversion of the revenue from the Ballantine distribution network, but the proviso is
included in a clause concerni g compensation for the proprietary rights.  Worse, while this might be
the most plausible explanation, it is not entirely convincing.  Worse yet, the
contract language failed to anticipate the central problem in the case: the Ballantine distribution
network turned out to be a disappointment.  Given the purpose of the transaction, we might
reasonably infer that shutting down that network completely would not constitute a substantial
discontinuance.  But that interpretation sits poorly with the contract language and the evidence
adduced.  It would take a very confident court, indeed, to impose this meaning on the clause.  The
court probably ended up at the right result regarding the proviso despite the contract’s lack of
guidance as to how to get there.
III. Concluding Remarks
Generally speaking, giving content to an amorphous concept like “best efforts” is extremely
difficult.  Even in this contract, in which “best efforts” was invoked seven times and “good faith”
once, it is hard to determine how a court should respond to claims that particular best efforts
obligations were not met.  How, for example, should one deal with a complaint that Falstaff had failed
to meet its best efforts obligation to maintain as its own employees Ballantine’s sales, marketing,
clerical and administrative personnel?  Ironically, while the problem is generally difficult or intractible,
in the one case that has filtered down to the casebook level, the problem turns out to be an easy one.
The context—a one-shot sale of assets—delimits the feasible m anings of “best efforts” and all of the
meanings lead to the same conclusion: the courts got it wrong.
